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Abstract 
 
All business organizations have vision, mission and organisational objectives, which are 
geared towards improved performance and survival thus forming the driving force behind 
the decisions made by its management team. The organizational objectives of the company, 
however,  is what deterimnes the type of structure the company puts in place in an attempt 
to achieve the set objectives. Corporate governance has been acliamed to be a major tool for 
enhancing corporate image, reduce missapropriation of fund, attract investors as well as 
improve the performance of the company. This study however examines the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance of listed companies in 
Nigeria. Using return on asset (ROA) as a proxy for financial performance, the weighted 
fixed effect regression method of analysis was used to determine the type of relationship 
that exists between the corporate governance variables and financial performance of 
Nigerian companies. The study found that there is a significant positive relationship 
between board composition and management ownership with financial performance of 
Nigerian companies. There is a significant negative relationship between audit committee 
size, block ownership and duality of chairman and ceo position with financial performance 
of Nigerian companies. This study therefore recommends that regulators of business 
entities in Nigeria should consider the corporate governance variables and their impact on 
the financial performance of companies listed in Nigeria as the businesses are major 
instruments for improving economic development and attracting foreign investment. 
 
Keywords: Financial Performance,  Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Nigerian 
Companies 
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Introduction 
 
The various financial misaapropriations all 
over the world and the collapse of 
companies shook investors’ confidence in 
the capital markets and the effectiveness of 
existing corporate governance practices in 
promoting transparency and accountability 
in companies (Kajola, 2008; Adegbite & 
Nakajima, 2011), the question on how good 
corporate governance can be entrenched 
into corporations across the globe has 
lingered on, as well as questions relating to 
the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance, which led to a call for 
corporate governance reforms as well as 
improvement on existing codes of 
corporate governance in various countries 
(Reed, 2002). 
 
Principal objective of most profit oriented 
private business entities is profit 
maximization, (Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001) 
while the investment objective of any 
investor is maximization of returns on 
investment, which can only be achieved 
when the company invested in makes 
enough profit, thus maximizing the assets 
employed through returns on assets. To 
achieve the objective of profit 
maximization, several factors must be put 
in place, with high emphasis on the quality 
of the management team as well as the 
board of directors. Companies inaugurate 
the board of directors, who are expected to 
represent the interest of the owners of the 
company, therefore the need for the 
composition  of the board of directors to 
consist of executive and non executive 
directors (Security & Exchange 
Commission, 2003). The non executive 
directors are those directors that are not 
responsible for the day to day operations of 
the company.  
 
It’s been suggested that Nigerian firms 
should adopt corporate governance 
mechanisms that will increase the level of 
independence of the board to enhance the 
financial performance of these companies, 
its been identified as an important 
mechanisms for aligning the interests of 
managers and other stakeholders of the 
firm (Ahmadu, et al., 2011). Board 
composition has been identified as a major 
ingredient of corporate governance (Bello, 
2011). This concept evaluates the mix of 
the board members, with the executive 
directors not forming a major percentage 
of the entire board. This is seen as a major 
way of curtailing the execesses of the 
executive directors. The executive directors 
of companies because of their privileged 
information about the activities going on in 
the company as well as their ability to 
influence the direction of activities and 
events in the company are likely to make 
use this priviledged information for 
personal benefits at the detriment of the 
broad goals and objectives of the company. 
This sometimes may result into 
engagement in earnings management 
practices, which cannot be detected on the 
face of the report, but involves the adoption 
of some models to detect. To this end, 
however, what is the effect of board 
composition on the financial performance 
of Nigerian companies? 
 
The Nigerian Company and Allied Matters 
Act (CAMA) 2004 as ammended, Section 
359 (3&4) stipulates that all companies 
registered and operating in Nigeria should 
have an audit committee, with a mix of 
shareholders and directors. The Nigerian 
code of corporate governance of 2003 and 
2011 respectively identified the need for 
companies to set up an audit committee 
with an objective of raising the corporate 
governance standards of the company 
(Security & Exchange Commission, 2003), 
which should not be influenced by any 
dorminant member of the board. This 
clause has been attributed to be an 
ingredient for good corporate governance. 
What is the effect of this clause on the 
financial performance of Nigerian 
companies? 
 
Businesses solely owned by an individual 
have been aclaimed to perform better than 
companies owned by a group of people, as 
this has been  identified as a loophole for 
inefficiency on the part of the management 
team, with little or no interest, with the 
opinion that he has nothing to loose except 
his salary in the event of liquidation or 
folding up of the company. Howbeit, this is 
not without its own challenges, but what is 
the effect of this on the financial 
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performance of companies in Nigeria? To 
this end, this study examines the 
relationship that exist between board 
independence and financial performance of 
companies in Nigeria, also the study will 
determine the type of relationship that 
exists between ownership structure and 
financial performance of companies in 
Nigeria 
 
In an attempt to achieve the above stated 
objectives, this study therefore profer the 
following research hypotheses, which are 
stated in null form: 
 
H1: Board composition does not have a 
significant effect on the financial 
performance of Nigerian companies 
 
H2: Ownership structure does not have 
a significant effect on the financial 
performance of Nigerian companies 
 
H3: Audit committee composition does 
not have a significant effect on the  
financial performance of Nigerian 
companies 
 
Review of Literature 
 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms in 
Nigeria 
 
Corporate governance, which can been 
defined as the system of effective internal 
control, as well as effective internal checks 
and control of power or governance from 
within (Rossouw, et al., 2002), has 
receieved a great attention in the last few 
years from all sectors and countries of the 
world. Its been seen as a tool for financial 
market stability, investment and economic 
growth(OECD, 2004). As a result of the 
financial scandals in times past, as well as 
other forms of mispresentation of financial 
reports by the managers of companies, 
which has caused the companies and the 
investors great fortune, researchers as well 
as managers and regulators therefore 
suggested the need to improve on the code 
of corporate governance structure 
(Adegbite, 2012). Taking a cue from the 
case of enron, which demonstrated the 
limits of the monitoring board, pointing the 
way to the stewardship model, in which the 
directors take responsibility for ensuring 
the sustainability of the assets of the 
companies (Deakin & Suzanne, 2004). The  
guiding assumption of the code of 
corporate governance is that the fall of 
Enron was as a result of the the conflicts of 
interest on the part of the senior managers 
and lack of oversight on the part of the 
board of directors of enron and its advisers 
(Deakin & Suzanne, 2004). This assumption 
however, is what premised the inclusion of 
the need for non-executive directors to be 
actively involved in the operations of the 
business, to carryout their oversight 
functions. The role of the board has been 
attributed to the need for developing 
countries to boost their ability to attract 
resources for investment in an increasingly 
competitive environment (Ahmadu, et al., 
2011), while governance crisis has been 
linked to board of directors crisis, thus 
resolving that governance issues are 
central to the activities of the board of 
directors(Ayogu, 2001). Kajola (2008) 
noted that the supervision of managers, 
which is as a result of good corporate 
governance leads to higher stock prices or 
better long term performance, which 
results into the reduction of agency costs. 
Thus it is expected that a board with 
executive and non executive directors is 
able to carry out its oversight functions, 
which is expected to reduce wastages, 
curtail missapropriation of funds, reduce 
fraud and all forms of unethical practices in 
the compeny. As a result of this, it is 
expected that the financial objectives of the 
company is met, which is to minimize cost 
and maximize profit. A study conducted in 
Nigeria, it was concluded that there is need 
to strenghen board independence in 
developing countries like Nigeria with 
weak institutions (Adegbite, 2012) that 
need to attract foreign resources(Ahmadu, 
et al., 2011).  
 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance, 
was first published in the year 2003 by the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and the Corporate Affairs Commission 
(CAC). The code was published as a result 
of the identification of the role corporate 
governance plays in enhancing national 
growth and development, as  well as the 
realization of the need to align with the 
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international best practices and the need to 
attract foreign investors (Security and 
Exchange Commission, 2003). Corporate 
governance, which is to enhance 
transparency as well as check the excesses 
of those charged with the responsibility of 
managing the business, is a topical issue 
and has been linked to several 
organizational behaviours. 
 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance 
stipulates that board of directors should 
ensure that the company constantly 
improves its value creation as much as 
possible. This is a pointer to the fact that 
the success of the company is dependent on 
the efficiency level of the board of 
directors, thus membership of the board 
should not only be based on share 
ownership, but good understanding of the 
nature of the business and the environment 
in which the business operates. 
 
The main target of the Nigerian code of 
corporate governance of 2003 was the 
board of directors, who are the leaders of 
corporate organizations as well as other 
stakeholders, ensuring that they all have a 
clear understanding of their roles in 
enhancing the governance structure of the 
company. 
Companies have gained deeper 
understanding of how good corporate 
governance contribute to their 
competitiveness (Fodio, et al., 2013; Reed, 
2002). Investors, especially collective 
investment institutions and pension fund 
managers who act in a fiduciary capacity 
have realised that they have a role to play 
in ensuring good corporate governance 
practices, which affects the value of their 
investments. Economies around the world 
are now interested in corporate 
governance, with the understanding that it 
goes beyond the interest of shareholders 
and the performance of individual 
companies, but the entire economy. 
Therefore corporate governance is 
important to broad and growing segments 
of the entire population. As companies play 
a pivotal role in the economic development 
(Mensah, et al., 2003) of countries and 
reliance on companies has increased, 
therefore the need for good corporate 
governance (OECD, 2004; Husted & 
Serrano, 2002). 
 
The presence of an effective corporate 
governance system, within an individual 
company and across an economy as a 
whole, helps to provide a degree of 
confidence (Adegbite, 2012) that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a 
market economy. As a result, the cost of 
capital is lower and firms are encouraged 
to use resources more efficiently, thereby 
corporate governance is one key element in 
improving economic efficiency and growth 
as well as enhancing investor confidence 
(Fodio, et al., 2013). Corporate governance 
involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined. Good 
corporate governance should provide 
proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are 
in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders and should facilitate effective 
monitoring. underpinning growth (OECD, 
2004). 
 
As a result of the identified benefits of good 
corporate governance, developed and 
developing countries have promulgated 
several codes to resolve the corporate 
governance issues as a result of the 
identified challenges in companies. 
However there is no single model of good 
corporate governance but some common 
elements have been identified (OECD, 
2004). Realizing the need to align with the 
International Best Practices, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
collaboration with the Corporate Affairs 
Commission inaugurated a seventeen (17) 
member Committee on June 15, 2000 in 
Nigeria, constituted a committee to look 
into the enactment of a code of corporate 
governance in line with the International 
expectation. The Committee, which was 
headed by Atedo Peterside was mandated 
to identify the weaknesses in the current 
corporate governance practice in Nigeria as 
at that date and fashion out the necessary 
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changes that will improve the Nigerian 
corporate governance practices.  
 
 
Corporate Governance Variables / Index 
 
Literature has shown that several variables 
can be used in the measurement of the 
strenght of corporate governance in a 
company. The impact of the various 
variables and their effect of the 
organisations have been explored in 
literature and conclusions reached thereby. 
This study however will be considering 
some of these variables as reviewed in 
literature and their informed effect on the 
governance structure of any company and 
financial performance. 
 
Audit Committee Composition 
 
The Board of Directors of companies are 
expected to establish an audit committee of 
at least three non-executive directors with 
written terms of reference, which deal 
clearly with its authority and duties, Audit 
Committees should be established in 
accordance with CAMA Section 359 (3 & 4), 
with not more than one executive on them. 
A majority of the non-executives serving on 
the committee should be independent of 
the company (i.e. independent of 
management and free from any business or 
other relationship, which could materially 
interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgment as committee 
members). The Chairman of the Audit 
Committee should be a Non Executive 
Director, to be nominated by the members 
of the Audit Committee, while membership 
of the audit committee should be for a fixed 
tenure. However, any member of the 
committee should be eligible for re-election 
after his tenure. The Secretary of the Audit 
Committee should be the Company 
Secretary, Auditor or such other person 
nominated by the Committee. Members of 
the Committee should understand basic 
financial statements, and should be capable 
of making valuable contributions to the 
Committee. Considering some of the 
qualifications expected of the members of 
the audit committee, with relation to their 
literacy in accounting, this qualification is 
expected to enhance the delivery of their 
services as a committee that is in charge of 
moderating the financial excesses of the 
managers and the boards as it relates to 
earnings management and instituting good 
corporate governance in an organisation. 
Audit committee, may have a more direct 
role in controlling earnings management, 
with the function of monitoring firm’s 
financial performance and financial 
reporting (Biao, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). 
Regulators around the world have 
acknowledged the important function of 
audit committees in financial reporting 
even before financial scandals occurred at 
the end of the last decade (Murya, 2010).  
 
The Nigerian code of corporate governance 
emphasised the need for audit committee 
independence from managers. The audit 
committee has an overseeing and 
monitoring function of managers’ 
discretion over the accounting policy. An 
effective audit committee adds to the 
quality of the audit process at two levels. 
First, by overseeing the financial reporting 
process and examining major accounting 
measurement and choices, and this enables 
the committee to mitigate earnings 
management practices. Secondly, by 
coordinating the internal and external 
audits and, above all, assuring external 
auditors’ independence and freedom from 
managerial pressure (Murya, 2010). 
 
According to Duztas (2008), boards are 
important boundary spanners, as they can 
be used as a mechanism to form links with 
the external environment, achieve inter-
organisational linkages, such as the 
appointment of outside directors and 
board interlocks, which can be used to 
manage environmental contingencies. 
Directors who are prestigious in their 
professions and communities can be a 
source of timely information for executives 
and also used as channels of marketing the 
brand of the company. Also with the 
inclusion of external non executive 
directors, individuals with good managerial 
skills can be brought on board, which may 
enhance the oversight functions of the 
board as a whole. 
 
Duality of Position of Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of Companies 
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Duality occurs when the same person 
occupies both the CEO and chairman 
positions on the board. Past studies test the 
chairman’s independence and the 
concentration of power on the board. It is 
argued in the governance literature that 
the objectivity and quality of board 
oversight may suffer if the CEO also chairs 
the board. Duality of position is envisaged 
to cause centralisation of power in a 
company, which can result in the CEO being 
able to exercise excessive influence over 
the board by setting board agendas, 
managing meetings and controlling the 
flow of information to its members (Murya, 
2010).  The Nigerian code of corporate 
governance stipulates that the Board of a 
company should not be dominated by an 
individual, while responsibilities at the top 
of a company should be well defined. It 
further emphasized that the position of the 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
should ideally be separated and held by 
different persons with a note that the 
combination of the two positions in an 
individual represents an undue 
concentration of power. The code however 
gave a clause to the expectation by stating 
that “In exceptional circumstances where 
the position of the Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer are combined in one 
individual, there should be a strong non-
executive independent director as Vice 
Chairman of the Board” (SEC, 2003). 
 
Board Composition in Companies 
 
Research on board composition and board 
leadership structure has also been 
dominated by a focus on company 
performance (Dally & Dalton, 1999), which 
is consistent with the institutional 
investment community's demands for 
more independent board structures. The 
general notion is that boards with higher 
proportion of non executive/independence 
directors are generally objective and 
independent in its monitoring function 
(Bello, 2011). The Nigerian code of 
corporate governance stipulates some 
requirements for the composition of board 
members in companies. The code stipulates 
that the board should be composed in such 
a way as to ensure diversity of experience 
without compromising compatibility, 
integrity, availability, and independence. It 
states that the board should comprise of a 
mix of Executive and Non-Executive 
Directors, to be headed by a Chairman of 
the Board. Members of the Board should be 
individuals with upright personal 
characteristics and relevant core 
competences, preferably with a record of 
tangible achievement, knowledge on board 
matters, a sense of accountability, integrity, 
commitment to the task of corporate 
governance and institution building, while 
also having an entrepreneurial bias.  
 
According to Duztas (2008), boards are 
important boundary spanners, as they can 
be used as a mechanism to form links with 
the external environment, achieve inter-
organisational linkages, such as the 
appointment of outside directors and 
board interlocks, which can be used to 
manage environmental contingencies. 
Directors who are prestigious in their 
professions and communities can be a 
source of timely information for executives 
and also used as channels of marketing the 
brand of the company. Also with the 
inclusion of external non executive 
directors, individuals with good managerial 
skills can be brought on board, which may 
enhance the oversight functions of the 
board as a whole and enhance the 
performance of the company. 
 
The code of corporate governance in an 
attempt to ensure that the executive 
directors do not use their power to run the 
affairs of the company in a way that is not 
to the advantage of other stakeholders in 
the company. A board of directors with 
more executive directors than the non 
executive directors is seen as an 
overbearing board with the assumption 
that the executive directors will lord major 
decisions on the entire board, which may 
boost insider dealings and unethical 
practices in the company. However the 
code states that a an equal mix of executive 
and independent non executive directors is 
expected to have an independent board 
(Security and Exchange Commission, 
2010).  
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The Nigerian code of corporate governance 
stipulates that the board of Nigerian 
companies should comprise of a mix of 
Executive and Non-Executive Directors, 
which is a factor that informs the degree of 
independence in a company. Wu, Lin, Lin, & 
Lai (2010) concluded that there is a 
positive significant relationship between 
board independence and firm performance. 
Independent boards are more likely to 
remove poorly performing CEOs from 
office, which leads to improved 
shareholder value(Masulis, 2013). Prior 
study on board independence and firm 
financial performance in Nigeria adopted 
the use of fixed-effects regression on 89 
sampled companies in Nigeria for the 
period 1996-2004(Ahmadu, et al., 2011). 
 
Ownership Structure of Companies 
 
The code of corporate governance in an 
attempt to reduce the overbearing control 
the board of directors have on the company 
stipulates that equal information must be 
made available to both minority and 
majority shareholders. It also stipulate that 
the shareholdings of the members of the 
board should be disclosed in the financial 
reports as published. The Nigerian code of 
best practices and corporate governance of 
2003 also states that there must be a 
representative of the minority 
shareholders on the board of directors. 
This is to ensure that the operations of the 
board and the decision making process is 
not left in the hands of a few individuals. 
The ownership structure of companies has 
been identified as a major tool in ensuring 
good corporate governance (Murya, 2010; 
OECD, 2004).  
 
Research Methods 
 
This study adopts the use of the fixed-effect 
regression method to determine the type of 
relationship that exists between board 
independence, ownership structure and 
firm financial performance of Nigerian 
companies. The fixed effects regression 
was adopted because of the missing data of 
some of the sampled companies. This study 
adopted the use of panel data for 137 
companies for the period 2003 to 2010. 
This data was subjected to the 
heteroscedasticity test, which shows that 
the data was heteroscedastic, thus the need 
to apply weight on company basis. The 
heteroscedasticity of the data is as a result 
of the varying sizes of companies in the 
sample as well as the performance. 
However, the study used return on assets 
(ROA) of the sampled companies as a proxy 
for measuring performance, the proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board 
was used to determine the board 
independence of the sampled companies, 
while the percentage of management 
shares to total share capital of the sampled 
companies was used to determine the 
ownership structure, for the period of 
study.  
 
Model Specification 
 
The model of the study at hand is as 
presented below: 
 
ROAit = β0 + β1BODSIZEit+ β2BODINDit + 
β3AUDCOMINDit + β4AUDCOMSIZEit + 
β5MGTOWNit + β6BLOCKOWNit + 
β7DUALITYit + TAit+ REVit + eit…… Equation 
(1) 
 
Where: 
ROAit  is Return on Assets for 
company i in year t 
BODSIZEit is Board Size of company i 
in year t 
BODINDit is Board Independence of 
company i in year t 
AUDCOMINDit  is Audit Committee 
Independence of company i in year t 
AUDCOMSIZEit is Audit Committee Size of 
company i in year t 
MGTOWNit is Management Ownership 
of company i in year t 
BLOCKOWNit  is Block Ownership of 
company i in year t 
DUALITYit is Dualisation of Chairman 
and CEO position of company i in year t 
TAit   is Total Asset of company i 
in year t 
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REVit  is Turnover of company i 
in year t 
e   is residual of the equation 
 
Data Analyses 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs       Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Roa 747     .0443113 .2018449 -2.04132    2.263246 
Bodsize 685     9.684672 3.175631 0 23 
Bodind 685      .488292 .135168 0 0.86 
Audcomind 685     .4098978 .1857571 0 0.67 
Audcomsize 685     4.766423 2.122914 0 7 
Mgtown 685     10.57496 19.518 0 100 
Blockown 685     .9489051 .2203522 0 1 
Duality 685     .0963504 .2952867 0 1 
Ta 747     2.37e+08 1.23e+09 389 2.35e+10 
Rev 756     1.49e+08 8.36e+08 0 1.19e+10 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
 roa      bdsiz     bdcm      adcd       adcsz       mgtn         blkw         dual             ta            rev 
roa     1.0000 
bdsiz  0.0727 1.0000 
bdcm 0.0020 0.2037  1.0000 
adcd  0.0621 0.0535  -0.0772   1.0000 
adcsz 0.1203 0.1889  -0.0374   0.8921    1.0000 
mgtn  0.0574 -0.0454 -0.1626   0.0911     0.0923    1.0000 
blkw  -0.1218 -0.0620 0.1367   -0.0562   -0.0638    0.1191    1.0000 
dual  -0.0083 -0.1046 -0.0958   -0.0158   0.0386     0.1928    0.0757     1.0000 
ta       0.0168  0.0032  -0.0646   0.0794    0.0825     0.0844   -0.0871     -0.0347    1.0000 
rev     0.0476  -0.0127 -0.0785   0.0756    0.0722     0.0800   -0.0027     -0.0363    0.7767    1.0000 
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Table 2: Summary of Data Analyses 
 
Variables t-value P>[t] Sig Coef Std. Error 
BODSIZE -0.66 0.512 -.0003598 .0005483 
BODCOMP 6.15 0.000* .0691175 .0112341 
AUDCOMP 1.01 0.314 .0238887 .0237242 
AUDCOMSIZE -2.29 0.022** -0.0048739 .0021288 
MGTOWN 10.63 0.000* .0015997 .0001505 
BLOCKOWN -4.44 0.000* -.042736 .0096241 
DUALITY -7.29 0.000* -.0404018 .0055446 
SIZE (TA) -1.82 0.069*** -2.67e-12 1.47e-12 
TURNOVER (REV) 11.56 0.000* 3.70e-11 3.20e-12 
CONSTANT 3.54 0.000* .0342725 .0096836 
Source:     Research (2013)   * Significant at 1% significant level  ** Significant at 5% significant level  *** 
Significant at 10% significant level 
Findings 
 
With reference to the data analyses 
presented in the previous section, this 
study has identified that there is a 
significant positive relationship between 
board independence and financial 
performance of Nigerian companies. This 
finding however, shows that companies 
with high level of board composition of 
mixture of non executive to executive 
directors are likely to perform better than 
companies with low level of board 
composition. This however can be said to 
be as a result of the non-execurive 
directors ability to carry out their oversight 
functions of checkmating the executive 
directors and influencing the activities of 
the executive directors to ensure they 
engage in profitable ventures. 
 
This study further revealed that there is a 
significant positive relationship between 
the management ownership structure of 
Nigerian companies and their financial 
performance. This therefore connotes that 
companies in which the board of directors 
have ample percentage of the 
shareholdings are likely to perform better 
than companies that the directors have 
little or no investment. This further 
buttresses the fact that where a man’s 
treasure is, there his heart will be. This is 
true of the Nigerian environment that 
directors are likely to guard their 
investment jealously to avoid illiquidity, 
which they know will affect them at the 
long run as well as affect their returns on 
investment. Also there is a negative and 
significant relationship between audit 
commitee size and financial performance of 
Nigerian companies. This shows that there 
is need for close monitoring of the audit 
committee size and its effect on the agency 
cost, which will have an effect on the 
profitability of companies. 
 
There is a negative significant relationship 
between block ownership and financial 
performance of Nigerian companies. This 
means the higher the block ownership, the 
lower the financial performance of 
Nigerian companies. This however is a 
pointer to the fact that block ownership 
may result into insider trading, which may 
be detrimental to the interest of the other 
stakeholders in the business. Furthermore, 
there is a negative and significant 
relationship between dualisation of 
chairman and ceo position and financial 
performance of Nigerian companies. This 
shows that the higher the duality, the lower 
the performance, which is a pointer to the 
fact that dualisation of ceo and chairman 
position results into concentration of 
power in the hands of a few individuals, 
which may affect the operational efficiency 
of the company. 
 
Worthy of note is the fact that there is a 
negative but insignificant relationship 
between board size and financial 
performance of Nigerian companies. This 
means the higher the board size the lower 
the performance, which may be as a result 
of the agency cost, thus a need for close 
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evaluation of the adequate board size, 
which will not be to the detriment of the 
profitability of the company. Also, there is a 
positive and insignificant relationship 
between audit committee independence 
and financial performance of Nigerian 
companies. This shows that the higher the 
audit committee independence, the better 
the financial performance of Nigerian 
companies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With respect to the various analyses 
conducted, this study therefore concludes 
that corporate governance mechanisms 
such as has a significant impact on the 
financial performance of companies in 
Nigeria. Therefore a thorough evaluation of 
the direct impact of the corporate 
governance indices is what determines the 
type of relationship that exists between 
firm performance and the corporate 
governance indices. Board composition and 
size should be managed in such a way that 
it does not increase the agency cost of 
operation which may later affect the 
performance of companies on the longrun. 
Furthermore, this study concludes that 
audit committee size and composition 
should also be closely monitored in order 
to avoid its adverseeffect on the financial 
performance of the companies. Worthy of 
note also is the need to state that 
ownership structure as well as the 
dualisation of chairman and ceo position 
are major corporate governance issues, 
which if not adequately monitored will 
have an adverse effect on the performance 
of companies in Nigeria.  
 
Recommendations 
 
With respect to the findings of this study 
and the conclusions therefrom, this study 
therefore recommends that the regulators 
of companies in Nigeria monitor closely the 
various corporate governance indices and 
their respective effect on the financial 
performance of the companies, as well as 
the expertees of those appointed as 
directors of companies in the area of 
operations of the business. It is also 
recommended that potential investors 
should consider the percentage interest of 
the directors, both executive and non-
executive before investing in any company, 
as this will determine the extent at which 
the directors will pursue the investment 
objective of maximizing shareholders 
return on investment, which can only be 
done when the company makes enough 
profit to be redistributed. Also potential 
investors should be careful enough to avoid 
companies with the chairman dualising as 
the chief executive officer. 
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